From 2007 to 2009, Danone, the French multinational food company, was in a fierce battle with China-based Wahaha Group (the largest beverage producer in China) to win control of their joint ventures (JVs) in China. The fight is reported to have started in 2005 when Danone uncovered some unusual financial figures at the JVs, but this did not become known to the public until 2007, when Danone and Wahaha Group failed to resolve their disputes on the selling price of Wahaha-related non-joint ventures (non-JVs).
The quarrel between Danone and Wahaha Group escalated. It involved disputes on brands, as well as on perceived unequal commitments to the JVs. Lawsuits were launched, both in China and internationally. How did cooperation turn into a large-scale battle? How did the story unfold?
Danone and its international expansion
Originally named Boussois-Souchon-Neuvesel (BSN), Danone was founded in 1966 when two glass companies, the Souchon-Neuvesel glassworks and Glaces de Boussois, merged to compete in the expanding Common Market. The setback in the glass industry prompted BSN to switch its focus to its downstream business, namely the beverages industry. In 1969 and 1970, BSN acquired Evian, Kronenbourg and the European Breweries Company, becoming the leading manufacturer of beer, mineral waters and baby food in France in 1970. In 1973, BSN merged with Gervais DANONE, creating the largest French food group. In the mid and late 1970s, BSN Gervais DANONE gradually retreated from the lagging glass sector, focusing solely on food after the group divested Boussois in 1981.
After establishing its leadership position in France in the 1970s, BSN Gervais DANONE started to expand in the European market in the 1980s, through a series of acquisitions, joint ventures and partnerships, including the cross-shareholding arrangement with the Agnelli empire in Italy in 1987, the alliance with the Fossati family in Italy in 1989, the acquisition of Generale Biscuit in 1986 and the takeover of Nabisco’s European subsidiaries in 1989. By 1989, Danone had become the third largest food group in Europe, behind only Nestlé and Unilever. It was very well established in southern Europe, England and Germany.
During its European expansion, especially in Italy and Spain, Danone used a low-cost, low-risk and relatively rapid market entry approach. Danone established relationships with powerful local businesses by acquiring minority shareholdings, thereby creating beachhead positions for its further expansion into the host country. For example, the alliance with the Agnelli family in Italy helped Danone to acquire Galbani (Italy’s number one fresh cheese producer) and Agnesi (a pasta producer), and to start a cooperative relationship with Peroni (a brewer).
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, BSN Gervais DANONE expanded into formerly communist Eastern Europe. Initially, it exported goods from Western Europe, but it soon manufactured the same goods in these host countries by either cooperating with or taking control of local firms such as cookie producers Cokoladovny in the Czech Republic and Bolshevik in Russia.
To assess the international potential of its brands and the appropriate locations for its marketing expatriates, BSN Gervais DANONE set up a specialized export division in 1993. Its partnerships and buyouts helped it expand quickly in emerging markets such as Asia, Latin America and South Africa. In June 1994, it changed its name to Groupe DANONE. Since 1998 Danone has sped up its international expansion, with around 40 acquisitions in Central Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Danone currently has four divisions: Fresh Dairy Products, Medical and Nutrition, Baby Nutrition and Waters. It employs 100,995 people in more than 120 countries and is the world leader in fresh dairy products and medical nutrition.[i]
Danone in China
Danone entered China in 1987 by founding Danone Yogurt Company in Canton. Not knowing much about the peculiarities of the Chinese market, Danone brought almost identical French products to the Chinese market, only to find out that just a few consumers had refrigerators to store fresh dairy products, Danone’s products were too expensive for the average Chinese consumer and many Chinese consumers were lactose intolerant.
This initial setback with dairy products drove Danone to copy in China the alliance strategy used with great success to expand into Italy and Spain in the 1980s. Danone decided to capitalize successful local businesses rather than build its own businesses from scratch, resulting in a strong focus on joint ventures and acquisitions. Unlike most multinationals, Danone gave these acquired local businesses a great deal of autonomy. The joint ventures and acquired firms continued to sell their products under their own brands. Until late 2002, 80 per cent of Danone’s sales in China were under local brands. Furthermore, Danone let the former executives run the businesses and didn’t get involved much in daily operations. In fact, Danone functioned more like a capital investor, linking its joint ventures through capital investment rather than joint products.
This expansion strategy in China worked very well. In 2001, Danone had become one of the largest food concerns in China, with US $1.2 billion in sales, more than 50 plants and around 25,000 employees.[ii] Accounting for 9 per cent of Danone’s international sales in 2003, China became Danone’s third largest market, tied with the US after France and Spain. More importantly, not only did sales grow strongly, but operating profit margins were also much higher than the global average of 12.2 per cent.[iii]
Danone and Wahaha appeared to have a perfect marriage
The history of the Hangzhou Wahaha Group Co., Ltd can be traced back to the Hangzhou Shangcheng District School-Run Enterprise Sales Department, founded by Qinghou Zong in 1987. Its early success selling nutritional drinks to students won the favour of the Hangzhou city government, whose support paved the way for the firm to acquire the Hangzhou Canned Food Product Co. in 1991. The Hangzhou Wahaha Group Co. was established in 1991, with ‘Wahaha’ referring to the sound of a baby laughing. In 1994, the Wahaha Group acquired three other companies in the province of Sichuan.
In the mid 1990s, the Wahaha Group did very well in the Chinese market, with around 2,000 employees, RMB 1 billion in sales (around US $200 million), and RMB 200 million (around US $40 million) in profits. However, it was afraid that it would soon lose its competitiveness in an era when foreign multinationals were entering China, so it was eager to expand its scale and market share in China. Unfortunately, the Wahaha Group lacked the necessary financial capital to expand. Then Danone came into the picture through the introduction of the Hong Kongbased Peregrine Group.
Both Wahaha and Danone expected to gain something from the cooperation. Wahaha needed cash, and it also hoped to adopt new technology and managerial techniques from Danone. Meanwhile, joint ventures with a strong local firm in a fast-growing emerging market were a perfect opportunity for Danone, especially considering Danone’s disastrous 1987 solo efforts in China. Moreover, Danone “lacked the management depth and size to grow quickly”.[iv]
The cooperation between Danone and Wahaha started in 1996. Danone and Peregrine Group set up a Singapore-based firm called Jinja. Jinja and the Wahaha Group then set up five JVs in 1996, with Wahaha controlling 49 per cent of the shares, Danone 41 per cent and Peregrine 10 per cent.[v] Jinja invested US $45 million in the JVs, while the Wahaha Group gave the JVs the assets from five of its subsidiaries. All three parties agreed to let the Wahaha Group take full control of the everyday operations of the JVs.
Even after Danone took the position of majority shareholder in 1998 (when Peregrine Group sold its shares in Jinja because of Peregrine’s financial problems during the Asian crisis), Danone did not have a single executive in the joint ventures and Zong ran the joint ventures with a high degree of autonomy.
The cooperation appeared to work well. The new cash from Jinja enabled Wahaha to invest in both marketing and advanced production lines. In 2003, Wahaha had 15.6 per cent of China’s total beverage production, and its income reached US $1.24 billion. Since 1997, Wahaha had been China’s number one domestic, non-alcoholic beverage producer in both production volume and sales revenue. With annual sales of around US $1.35 billion, the JVs accounted for 75 per cent of Danone’s sales in China and about 3 per cent of its total global sales.[vi] By 2007, 39 JVs between the Wahaha Group and Danone had been established.
However, the JV agreements included several clauses that became the seeds of future disputes between Danone and Wahaha:
- Only 5 out of 10 Wahaha subsidiaries became real JVs, with the other ones (non-integrated companies) still using Wahaha brands.
- Wahaha agreed to transfer Wahaha brands to the JVs, but the modalities of the transfer were neither precise nor transparent.
- Danone agreed to a vague non-compete clause with the joint ventures.
Things become ugly
The disputes between Danone and Wahaha became known to the public on 3 April 2007, when Zong told Chinese reporters that Danone wanted to take over the RMB 5.6 billion assets of the non-JVs for only RMB 4 billion. These non-JVs had been established by the Wahaha Group and had not been integrated into the JV system.
Other long-time conflicts between Wahaha and Danone were also exposed, dating back to the very beginning of the JVs. Zong further accused Danone of designing a trap in the original JV agreement to win control of both the Wahaha brands and the JVs. On 5 April, Emmanuel Faber, President of Danone Asia-Pacific, said that Danone strictly followed the agreements/contracts between Danone and Wahaha. He also urged Zong to continue with the negotiations related to transferring the non-JVs to Danone.
On 7 April, a JV sued the three of its directors appointed by Danone, arguing that these three directors also functioned as directors of the JV’s rival companies in China.[vii] On 11 April, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce asserted it would remain neutral and not get involved in the disputes, though Wahaha and Danone were later reported to have provided the Ministry with related materials to explain their stand in early July.
The negotiations on the use of Wahaha brands and the takeover conditions did not lead to a positive outcome. On 9 April, Zong stated that, if necessary, he was prepared to establish another brand to replace Wahaha brands. Danone hinted that it might pursue litigation. On 11 April,
Emmanuel Faber stated at a press conference that Danone had notified Zong that the JVs would sue the non-JVs for using Wahaha brand names within 30 days if Zong did not take measures against the illegal use of Wahaha brands by the non-JVs.
On 9 May, Danone filed an arbitration request at the arbitration institute of the Stockholm court of commerce. On 4 June, Danone filed a complaint in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, USA, against two companies and two individuals (US citizens or US green card holders) related to the non-JVs, alleging that these non-JVs illegally used Wahaha brands and marketed products similar to those of the JVs. The two companies controlled some of the non-JVs; and the two individuals, reported later to be Zong’s wife and Zong’s daughter, were major shareholders of the two companies. On 7 June, Zong resigned from his position as Chairman of the Wahaha joint ventures, accusing Danone of hurting his family and hiring surveillance companies to trace him illegally. Zong remained Chairman of Wahaha Group, and Emmanuel Faber, previously Vice Chairman, became the interim Chairman of the Wahaha joint venture companies.
However, Emmanuel Faber found it hard to regain control of the JVs. First, the board meetings were wracked with divisions and disagreements. Second, Wahaha’s employees and distributors showed strong support for Zong, even asking Emmanuel Faber to pull out of the JVs. Some distributors refused to sell Wahaha brand products anymore and, as a result, some factories in the JVs had to cut production. As the same time, the Wahaha Group started to sell its products under two new brands.
What happened: Wahaha’s view
The Wahaha Group argued that it was the sole owner of Wahaha brands, that both the Wahaha Group and the JVs had equal rights to use Wahaha brands, that the non-JVs were established because Danone was not interested in the JVs’ expansion in China and that Danone violated the JV agreement by investing in Wahaha’s competitors in China.
Brands
The Wahaha Group filed two requests to transfer Wahaha brands to the JVs at the National Brand Bureau of China in April 1996 and September 1997, but the requests were rejected by the Bureau in order to prevent the loss of national brands. Knowing the difficulty of transferring the brands to the JVs, the Wahaha Group and Danone signed two contracts, a simplified version filed with the National Brand Bureau with the objective of bypassing administrative hurdles, and a complete version determining the rights of Danone and Wahaha. The simplified version did not limit the JVs’ use of Wahaha brands, while the complete version allowed the JVs to legally use Wahaha brands only for a period of 50 years. Revisions of the complete version in 1999 and 2005 again specified that the Wahaha Group was the owner of Wahaha brands.
The Wahaha Group argued that the complete version of the contract should be invalidated because the period of 50 years for the JVs to use the Wahaha brand names did not respect the Chinese brand laws. Danone had not paid the Wahaha Group in the form of either brand transfer fees or brand usage fees. From the perspective of the Wahaha Group, therefore, both the JVs and the Wahaha Group had rights to use Wahaha brands.
On 8 July 2007, Zong admitted that the Wahaha Group and Danone had not been entirely forward with the National Brand Bureau by designing both a simplified contract and a complete contract.[viii]
The lack of commitment from Danone
From Zong’s perspective, the Wahaha Group had not received any technological or managerial expertise from Danone. Moreover, because of Danone’s lack of understanding of the Chinese market at the early stage of the cooperation Danone had even created barriers when Wahaha tried to expand the JVs’ business, such as when Wahaha tried to launch Feichang Kele (translated as ‘Future Cola’), tried to expand their production of bottled water and tried to invest in the western regions of China. When such businesses succeeded and created much cash flow for the JVs, Danone started to let Zong and his team run the business in their own ways.
Interestingly, in late 2000, Danone took control of Robust Group, Wahaha’s largest competitor in China. Afterwards, Danone showed little interest in Wahaha’s request for further expansion. Considering that Danone had shares in several of Wahaha’s major competitors, the Wahaha Group reasoned that it should not expect Danone to provide more resources for investment. This is why the Wahaha Group set up many of the non-JVs.
Non-JVs
Wahaha argued that some of the non-JVs were already in existence at the very beginning of the cooperation with Danone. When Zong realized that Danone was not interested in further investment in the JVs, Zong decided to expand the non-JVs on his own. Zong argued that Danone was fully aware of the non-JVs, as annual audited reports of the JVs reported the connections between the JVs and the non-JVs.
Wahaha felt that Danone suddenly wanted to purchase the non-JVs simply because they appeared to be very profitable.
What happened: Danone’s view
Danone disagreed with the Wahaha Group’s view on both the ownership of the Wahaha brands and the legal status of the non-JVs. Moreover, according to Danone there was no formal noncompete clause at all in the JV agreement that would prevent Danone from investing in any other company in China.
Brands
Danone emphasized the actual content of the agreements/contracts. According to Danone, the initial JV agreement, the brand transfer contract and the two brand usage contracts all confirmed that the Wahaha Group had transferred the usage rights of Wahaha brands to the JVs and that
Danone had paid usage fees to the Wahaha Group. Thus, the JVs were the sole owner of the Wahaha brands and the Wahaha Group did not have the rights to use Wahaha brands in another business context such as the non-JVs.
Danone suspected that the Wahaha Group had not filed any request to transfer Wahaha brands through the National Brand Bureau at all.[ix] Moreover, as of 2001, the Wahaha Group had illegally permitted 87 companies to use Wahaha brands.[x] In 2005, Danone itself allowed 27 non-JVs to use Wahaha brands,[xi] but Danone stressed that it did not know that these non-JVs would compete with the JVs.
Commitment from Danone
Danone rejected the Wahaha Group’s allegation that Danone had not contributed to the JVs in the prior 11 years. Emmanuel Faber also explained that Danone chose not to increase its investments in the JVs simply because Danone had uncovered the existence of the non-JVs competing with the JVs.[xii] Moreover, Danone did send marketing and R&D personnel to the JVs, but they were kicked out by Zong.[xiii]
Finally, Danone felt that the agreements/contracts with Wahaha Group did not contain clauses preventing Danone from investing in other companies in China, even if these companies competed directly with the Wahaha Group.
Non-JVs
Danone discovered the allegedly illegal, Wahaha-related non-JVs in 2005, when these companies expanded aggressively and manufactured a growing share of the JVs’ products. Upon investigation, Danone discovered that Zong and his family members had started to operate these parallel companies around 2003.
It appeared that around 60 Wahaha-related non-JVs had illegally manufactured and sold products similar to those of the JVs through the JVs’ distributors and suppliers. In 2006 and 2007, the business of the non-JVs expanded significantly. In late 2006, the Wahaha Group set up a separate sales/marketing company. Distributors were asked by the Wahaha Group to pay the sales/marketing company separately, though the non-JVs had until then used the JVs’ sales channel and even received cash through JVs’ banking accounts from the distributors. For Danone, the non-JVs had created a totally independent and complete business system and the JVs were in danger of losing a substantial portion of their business.[xiv]
This is why Danone negotiated with Zong to take control of the non-JVs in 2006. In late 2006, Zong actually agreed to sell a majority share in the non-JVs to Danone and to integrate the nonJVs into the JVs system, but he finally pulled out of the deal in 2007.[xv]
What happened: Commentators’ view
Most commentators in China agreed that the JVs were the owners, or at least the legal users, of the Wahaha brands, according to the agreements/contracts between Danone and the Wahaha Group. The Wahaha-related non-JVs were therefore viewed to have used Wahaha brands illegally. However, the agreements/contracts did leave substantial room for alternative interpretations.
Some commentators suspected that Danone and the Wahaha Group actually conspired to transfer the state-owned Wahaha brands to the JVs, with the intent of facilitating the privatization of the Wahaha Group.[xvi]
Emmanuel Faber argued that Zong agreed in the JV agreement to include Wahaha brands in the JVs and that the brands would be a part of Zong’s stake brought into the JVs.[xvii] Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the financial resources contributed by Danone were to be used as its investment in the JVs or as usage fees for Wahaha brands, or both.
Finally, Danone was widely accused of trying to secure a monopoly position in the Chinese market. In 2005, Danone had already invested in five of the top ten domestic beverage companies, gaining a controlling position in three of them. Danone, however, argued that its market share was less than 15 per cent, which was still below the 20 per cent threshold specified in Chinese monopoly laws, and that it still faced strong competitors such as Coca Cola and PepsiCo.[xviii]
By 11 July 2007, Danone and Wahaha Group had not reached any agreement on how to proceed further. In June 2007, Emmanuel Faber asserted that “at the end of the day, we want a fair share of the pie … we don’t want to destroy the pie”.[xix] However, Danone was in a very difficult situation: it might win in court and remain the legal owner of the Wahaha brands, but then be unable to run the JVs by itself. Danone had never operated the JVs, did not have the management resources to control the JVs and did not have much experience in running successful businesses in China on its own. For example, Robust, Wahaha’s former major competitor, reported a loss of RMB 157 million in 2005 and an expected loss of RMB 150 million in 2006 after Danone took over the operation from the entrepreneurs who started Robust.[xx]
Danone acknowledged that it took a risk by letting Zong run the JVs, but it believed that JVs would make Danone move forward at a faster pace than its competitors. Laurent Sacchi, Danone’s spokesman, said that “if we now have 30% of our sales in emerging markets and we built this in only ten years, it’s thanks to this specific tactic … [W]e have problems with Wahaha. But we prefer to have problems with Wahaha now to not having had Wahaha at all for the last ten years.”[xxi]
At the same time, the Wahaha Group had also benefited from the strategic alliance. It was also likely to be in a better position to do business in the post-litigation period than if no alliance had been struck with Danone. Both the JVs and non-JVs had been managed together in their daily operations. Marketing and sales had been controlled by the same management team. Even if Danone had won control of the JVs and the Wahaha brands, the Wahaha Group would have been able to move some of the key human resources to the non-JVs.[xxii]
How it unfolded …
In November 2007, the Hangzhou Arbitration Commission ruled that there was no legal requirement for the trademark of the Wahaha Group to be transferred to the joint ventures. Supporting the judgment, the Commission stated that there was a lapse in time for a justified case to be made against Wahaha. Controversy over the ruling quickly transpired as the local trademark office in Beijing supported Danone’s stance by confirming that the 1996 trademark agreement had never been declined.[xxiii] Danone quickly moved to appeal the decision and waited on other trials to present rulings. The appeal to the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court in China failed and left Danone with little hope of success in Chinese courts.[xxiv] Additional lawsuits were filed elsewhere in China, as well as in Los Angeles, The British Virgin Islands and Samoa against companies connected to Wahaha.[xxv] The lawsuits became extremely personal when Danone sued Mr Zong’s family for aiding in transfers to the non-JV businesses. The company even went as far as assisting the US tax authorities when an investigation was underway for a property belonging to Mr Zong.[xxvi] Danone did have some success with its international lawsuits, but it was evident that the situation in China was unlikely to turn for the better.[xxvii]
The intensity of the legal battle between Danone and the Wahaha Group eventually reached beyond just the companies involved. With strong nationalistic ties between Danone and the French government, and between the Wahaha Group and Chinese authorities, political leaders from each country became interested in the outcome of this case. In late 2007 while visiting China, French President Nicolas Sarkozy pressed the issue over a dinner hosted by Chinese President Hu Jintao. Soon after, a joint statement was released by the two companies stating “Both parties agree to temporarily suspend all lawsuits and arbitrations, stop all aggressive and hostile statements, and create a friendly environment for peace talks.”[xxviii]
Negotiations continued into 2008 with the help of government mediators; however an agreement was never reached during the courtroom truce period, which ended on 10 April 2008[xxix]. Appeals and reviews continued throughout 2008 with Danone earning little support for its allegations. On 30 September 2009 the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce’s Arbitration Institute ruled that the majority of claims against the Wahaha Group and Mr Zong be discarded. The only violation found was on the grounds that Mr Zong had broken compliance on confidentiality and non-competition agreements.[xxx]
After a tedious two-year dispute, Danone announced in October 2009 that it would sell its 51 per cent stake in the JVs. Danone received an estimated 300 million euros from the sale, despite the stake having a book value of 380 million euros.[xxxi] This announcement marked the end of all legal allegations between the two parties.
Interestingly, in 2007 Danone had also been embroiled in a fight about brands in India with the Wadia Group, an Indian conglomerate. Danone and the Wadia Group have been equal partners in Associated Biscuits International Holding, which controls Britannia, India’s largest biscuit maker and the owner of the Tiger brand. In 2004, Britannia found that Danone had registered the Tiger brand in around 70 countries and that Danone had been selling biscuits under the Tiger brand in other countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Danone argued that it had disclosed to Britannia’s board what it had done.
In a further sign of strained relations, the Wadia Group also claimed that the dairy business in which Danone invested in India would compete with Britannia, thereby violating the noncompete clauses in the joint venture agreement between Danone and Wadia.[xxxii] Danone was reported to have agreed to return the Tiger brand to Britannia,[xxxiii] and exit Britannia, in order to obtain the freedom to invest in the dairy business in India.[xxxiv]
Ironically, it was Danone standing accused of violating intellectual property in India, whereas it was this same firm that accused Wahaha of violating its intellectual property rights in China. Moreover, Danone had argued that the Britannia board and management had full knowledge of the international registration of the Tiger brand, using the same argument as Wahaha arguing that Danone had been fully aware of the non-JVs. Danone eventually sold its 51 per cent stake in the joint venture with Wadia Group in April of 2009.[xxxv]
National governments have played a role in Danone’s international business strategy. PepsiCo was prevented from taking over Danone two years ago partly because the French government did not want foreigners to control Danone “as a matter of national security” consistent with the French yogurt policy.[xxxvi] Similarly, Danone has been unable to purchase the Wahaha brands, partly because the Wahaha brands are viewed as national brands in China.
QUESTIONS
- What were the intentions of Wahaha Group and Danone when setting up joint ventures in China?
- How did the relationship between Wahaha Group and Danone change during the 11 years of cooperation? How did the bargaining power of both parties change?
- Did the long-term cooperation between both firms lead to more trust? Did you observe any problems of bounded reliability with the two firms’ cooperation? Was there a vicious cycle of suspicion? Was there a vicious cycle of increasing dependency on a partner?
- Was there a learning asymmetry in the joint ventures?
- Has Danone been able to access the location-bound FSAs of the Wahaha Group? Should Danone have rejected the joint venture entry mode in the first place?
- Can you provide an update on Danone’s activities in China after the sale of its joint venture assets to the Wahaha Group, using materials available on the Web?
Notes
[i] Danone company information, www.danone.com, accessed on 3 May 2012.
[ii] Leslie Chang and Peter Wonacott, ‘Cracking China’s market’, Wall Street Journal (9 January 2003), B.1.
[iii] Leslie Chang, ‘Danone’s China sales and profit make the country a top market’, Wall Street Journal (10 March 2004), B.4H.
[iv] James T. Areddy and Deborah Ball, ‘Danone’s China strategy is set back; dispute with venture partner highlights the risks of not going it alone’, Wall Street Journal (15 June 2007), A.10.
[v] However, Danone was the controlling shareholder of Jinja.
[vi] http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20070411/17433492856.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007. However, a Chinese news agency reported that the JVs accounted for around 5 per cent of Danone’s global operating profits in 2006, Xinhua, 9 May 2007, ‘Danone starts legal procedures against Wahaha after talks break down’, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2007-05/09/content_6077320.htm, accessed on 6 July 2007.
[vii] http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20070710/14573770710.shtml, accessed on 11 July 2007.
[viii] http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20070708/23403764003.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[ix] http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20070621/01053709694.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[x] http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/observe/20070612/04293681956.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xi] http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20070617/09503698289.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xii] http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20070411/17503492870.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xiii] http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20070419/14203518054.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xiv] http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/observe/20070612/04293681956.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xv] David Barboza and James Kanter, ‘A Chinese company fights its French partner’, New York Times (13 June 2007), C.8.
[xvi] http://opinion.news.hexun.com/2168067.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xvii] http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20070708/23403764003.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xviii] http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20070419/14203518054.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xix] Barboza and Kanter, ‘A Chinese company fights its French partner’, C.8.
[xx] http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20061230/07183210427.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xxi] Areddy and Ball, ‘Danone’s China strategy is set back’, A.10.
[xxii] http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20070615/03203693838.shtml, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xxiii] Geoff Dyer, ‘Danone blow in China brand dispute’, [Asia Edition]. Financial Times (11 December 2007), 21.
[xxiv] Geoff Dyer, ‘Danone offers truce in legal fight with Chinese partner Wahaha’, [Asia Edition] Financial Times (17 December 2007), 17.
[xxv] Michelle Ng, ‘International Business: Danone’s Wahaha appeal is dismissed’, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) (6 August 2008), B.2.
[xxvi] James T. Areddy, ‘Partners fight over Wahaha in China, firm’s founder, Danone appear headed for split’, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) (28 July 2008), B.1.
[xxvii] James T. Areddy, ‘Danone loses dispute in trademark case’, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) (11 December 2007), B.5.
[xxviii] Mure Dickie, ‘Danone and Wahaha agree legal ceasefire in attempt to end feud’, [Asia Edition]. Financial Times (24 December 2007), 11.
[xxix] J. Tao and E. Hillier, ‘A tale of two companies’, The China Business Review (May 2008), 35(3), 44–47.
[xxx] Tom Mitchell & Geoff Dye, ‘Danone learns perils of doing business in China’, Financial Times (9 November 2009).
[xxxi] Scheherazade Daneshkhu, Sundeep Tucker and Patti Waldmeir, ‘Danone ends Wahaha tie-up’, Financial Times (1 October 2009), 17.
[xxxii] Jenny Wiggins, ‘Danone faces India brand suite’, Financial Times (13 April 2007), 27.
[xxxiii] ‘Danone to return Tiger brand to Britannia, investment dispute may go on – report’, AFX News Limited (20 April 2007), www.abcmoney.co.uk/news/20200759780.htm, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xxxiv] ‘Danone may exit Britannia Industries; to pursue dairy, beverage plans – report’, Thomson Financial (21 June 2007), www.abcmoney.co.uk/news/21200791147.htm, accessed on 12 July 2007.
[xxxv] Jenny Wiggins, ‘Danone and Wadia part ways’ Financial Times (15 April 2009), 15.
[xxxvi] ‘Yoghurt turns sour Troubled Asian ventures. Will Wahaha have the last laugh?’, Financial Times (14 April 2007), 8.