When Talisman Energy, a Canada-based oil and gas company, bought 25 per cent of the shares in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) by acquiring Arakis in August 1998, Jim Buckee, Talisman’s CEO at the time, was full of enthusiasm about the ‘spectacular potential’ of the deal.[i] Although Talisman foresaw political risks involved in the project, it never expected itself to become caught in an international storm of protest from shareholders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights groups both abroad and at home. Frustrated by the negative impact of the Sudan project on Talisman’s share price, the enormous managerial energy required to deal with the protests, and the danger of being de-listed from the New York Stock Exchange, Talisman sold its Sudanese oil assets in October 2002 to Oil and Natural Gas Corp, India’s national oil company.
However, Talisman’s retreat from Sudan has been a hollow victory for the campaigners. Even in 2012, people in South Sudan have yet to benefit from oil revenues and are facing severe food shortages, which affect over half of the population.[ii] What happened during the whole process? Why did so many stakeholders want Talisman to get out of Sudan? Who actually benefited from Talisman’s departure?
Sudan, the war and human rights
Sudan declared independence in 1956, before which Great Britain controlled Sudan as two separate colonies, the South and the North. Civil wars between Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan have ravaged the country for most of the time since the country’s independence.
Historically, Southern Sudan was predominantly black and Christian, while Northern Sudan was mainly Arab and Muslim. Great Britain further worsened these divisions during the colonial period by forbidding people from the south to go north or vice versa. The increased isolation laid the seeds for further conflict between Southern Sudan and Northern Sudan. The year 1983 saw the start of the most recent round of fighting between the South and the North, when President Nimeiry revoked the autonomy granted to the South in 1972 and imposed Islamic law on the Christian South. This intensified the anger of the South, which had always felt it was given an unfair share of national resources. The South organized the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to fight against the government. However, by the late 1990s, the fighting only led to a more disintegrated South, with the government controlling garrison towns, and SPLM and many other factions controlling the rest. The war has resulted in at least two million fatalities, as well as the large-scale abduction of women and children, and the displacement of families.[iii]
While the conflict in Sudan had been ongoing more or less continually since independence, it was the emergence of two regional conflicts in the early 1990s that elevated human rights violations and genocide to the world stage. From 1992 to 1995, some 200,000 Muslims were killed in Bosnia by forces allied to Serbia, while in Rwanda during 1994 some 800,000 Tutsi tribesmen were put to death by the Hutu majority.[iv] Intervention by the world community seemed muted while the atrocities were happening, though condemnation did follow when it became increasingly clear what was taking place.
Several perpetrators of the atrocities were eventually brought to justice, but not before much soul searching, including the deliberation of the Bosnian genocide case at the International Court of Justice.[v] In 1993, a landmark court case was introduced: for the first time in the 60-year history of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), one state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, accused another state, Serbia and Montenegro, of genocide. Clearly the world community was waking up to the challenges posed by ethnic conflicts.
By the late 1990s, the ongoing conflict in Sudan, pitting a largely Arab and Muslim regime in the North against a largely black and Christian population in the South, had found a resonating chord with human rights activists. Mounting pressure from human rights and religious groups made Sudan into one of the Bush Administration’s priorities.[vi] Nina Shea, the director of the Center of Religious Freedom in Washington, DC, commented on the significance of this case: “Sudan is the litmus test for human rights policy under the Bush administration.”[vii]
Oil, Sudan and Talisman
The production of oil in Sudan came well after Sudan’s independence, and was driven by a rapid rise in the price of oil, first in the early 1970s and then again in the early 1980s. An oil embargo by members of OPEC during the Arab–Israeli conflict in the 1970s, and then consequences of the Iranian revolution in the early 1980s, caused several countries to increase their efforts to find oil from non-OPEC sources. Sudan, as a non-OPEC oil country, was perceived as a location where oil might be found and profitably exploited.
Chevron was the first foreign oil company to explore oil in Sudan, with a concession granted by Sudan in 1975. In 1980, Chevron discovered the Unity and Heglig oilfields in Southern Sudan. However, armed attacks against Chevron’s facilities forced the company to withdraw from Sudan by selling its concession to Vancouver-based Arakis in 1993. Arakis continued to drill for new oil and announced in 1997 that it had identified 1.2 billion barrels in the Heglig and Unity oilfields.[viii]
In 1996, Arakis formed a consortium called GNPOC, with China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) holding a 40 per cent interest, Malaysia’s Petronas 30 per cent and Sudan’s Sudapet 5 per cent. However, Arakis was unable to finance its share, and it finally was acquired by Talisman in 1998.
Sudan, the Nile and water
Oil is not the only resource that attracts attention and is essential to modern societal functioning. Water and its uninterrupted supply in sufficient quantities and quality is a major objective underpinning sustainability and sustainable development of human communities. Its absence or potential absence has often been raised to explain emerging and continuing conflicts among different nations and even different stakeholders within one nation.[ix] This is certainly the case of the Nile region, whose drainage incorporates Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and parts of central Africa.
Egypt has consistently been able to dominate the use of the Nile’s water resource, even though virtually all of the water flowing through it originates outside its territorial boundaries. Mindful of the Nile’s importance, Egyptian regimes have consistently tried to limit the ability of upstream stakeholders to interfere with its flow, while also increasing its own buffer capacity useable during periods of abnormally low rainfall. The Aswan dam was completed in 1971, and has provided a significant reserve of water to sustain consumption during periods of otherwise low water flow. Furthermore, Egypt has sought to influence the development of the Nile’s water resource in upstream countries, particularly Sudan, by discouraging projects that could lead to increased water usage there. While diplomacy and economic means have been the preferred tools Egypt has employed, use of force has never been far beneath the surface considering its clear military advantage vis-à-vis upstream countries.[x]
The aspirations of some of the countries in the Nile region to wield regional power were constrained by the Cold War superpowers, even as local, low-grade conflicts continued. Internal ethnic and political strife in upstream countries discouraged development projects, thus indirectly supporting Egypt’s objectives. Ethiopia was waging a low-grade conflict, first with separatist forces in Eritrea and later with an independent Eritrea, as well as with Somalia. Sudan was embroiled in a separatist war with stakeholders in its south.
The end of the Cold War and the decline in the constraining influences of the US and the former USSR changed this situation. Egypt recognized that instability in the other Nile-region nations could be useful to its long-term objectives, and therefore fostered instability, so as to maintain its regional hegemony. It sponsored anti-governmental forces, including the rebel Sudanese People’s Liberation Army in Southern Sudan during the 1990s.[xi]
Thus, Egypt bears at least some responsibility for the conflict in Sudan. The conflict is not solely rooted in ethnicity, religion and domestic politics.
Talisman and its initial involvement in Sudan – “This is a world-scale, highly-visible project”[xii]
Headquartered in Calgary, Canada, Talisman Energy was initially established in 1953 as the Canadian subsidiary of British Petroleum (BP). After BP sold its Canadian interests in 1991, Talisman became an independent energy company and was later listed on both the TSX and NYSE. Its main business activities include the exploration, development, production, transportation and marketing of crude oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids.[xiii]
Since its establishment, Talisman has focused on both exploration and acquisitions to deal with the depletion of its Canadian oil reserves. For example, Talisman acquired Encor in 1993, Bow Valley Energy in 1994 and Arakis Energy in 1998.
This expansion path also took Talisman to the international market. The 1993 Encor acquisition brought Talisman its first international assets (in Algeria and Indonesia). By late 2001, Talisman’s exploration and operations areas had expanded from North America (the US and Canada) to the North Sea, South East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam), the Caribbean and Latin America (Columbia and Trinidad) and Africa and the Middle East (Algeria, Sudan and Qatar).
The opportunity provided by Arakis came to Talisman at a time when Talisman was actively pursuing offshore acquisition opportunities. Commenting on the 1998 Arakis acquisition, President and CEO Jim Buckee said, “We have looked at lots and lots of acquisitions and this one is by far the most exciting we see. It’s a good time to be making this sort of move.”[xiv] By 2001, this move was supplying Talisman with one-tenth of its oil.[xv]
The economics made good sense for Talisman. Talisman estimated that the GNPOC concession could hold between 8.5 and 12.5 billion barrels of oil, with the prospect for new discoveries in the region. Oil production increased from an initial 120,000 barrels/day in the mid 1990s to 200,000 barrels/day in 2000. In 1999, Talisman estimated that GNPOC’s upstream revenues would amount to US $10.45/barrel, with net revenue of US $7.28/barrel.[xvi]
Moreover, oil in Sudan was of high quality, with low sulphur content. Therefore, the oil was relatively easy to refine, resulting in low extraction costs and high revenues.
Finally, Talisman was also welcomed by the other three partners. Talisman’s financing and technological expertise would complement both the inexpensive labour provided by the other three parties and the political power provided by CNPC.[xvii]
Although the Sudan project involved dangers because of the civil war, Buckee considered the security risk ‘very acceptable’,[xviii] especially given the support from his three state-owned partners. Moreover, Talisman interpreted the civil war as mainly a domestic conflict involving 300 tribes – a situation much less dramatic than that described in the international press. Finally, the risk of bad publicity was expected not to hurt Talisman much either, given Talisman’s position as an upstream producer, rather than a company selling directly to consumers. Petrol station boycotts would not affect Talisman.[xix]
In early 1999, Buckee expressed Talisman’s perspective on human rights issues in Sudan in a letter to shareholders, stating that “Because Sudan presents significant challenges, we realized that this project would attract questions from varied sources. However, careful study last summer [1998] persuaded management that this is a sound business investment and our involvement could be carried out in a responsible, ethical manner. Experience to date confirms that judgment … We recognize Sudan’s chronic troubles, including poverty and conflict.”[xx]
The Sudan project never failed to meet Talisman’s economic expectations. It was the social issues that finally led the company to abandon the project.
Public pressure and the divestment campaign
Soon after its investment in Sudan, Talisman found itself under attack by some NGOs, shareholders, government-based entities and other stakeholders. In 1999, the list of critics even included US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, US Congressman Donald M. Payne, a New York-based church coalition called the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, the Task Force of Churches for Corporate Responsibility in Canada, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Africa Watch and Human Rights Watch, among many others. They all spoke out against Talisman because of the firm’s alleged involvement in human rights abuses, its support of the Sudanese government by providing oil revenues, and its role in displacing civilian populations.
For example, the Christian church leadership in Sudan condemned Talisman and other multinational oil companies for providing revenues to the government to purchase weapons and for allowing the government to use their airstrips and all-weather roads for military purposes.[xxi]
Such international criticism damaged Talisman’s reputation, but what really hurt the company were actions taken by stakeholders in Canada and the US.
Talisman’s involvement in Sudan became a major story in Canada. Media coverage in North America about Talisman’s Sudan project increased substantially during the course of 1999. In 1998, only 14 stories about Talisman’s involvement in human rights in Sudan were published in regional/local newspapers in Canada, such as the Calgary Herald, Toronto Star, Ottawa Citizen and Alberta Report.[xxii] In contrast, in 1999, around 292 articles were published, many of them in major publications such as the Financial Times, the Globe and Mail and the National Post.[xxiii] Most of the articles focused on the NGOs’ opposition to the project, further tainting Talisman’s image.
Many stakeholders protested against Talisman’s Sudan project, while some shareholders proposed initiatives to address this issue during Talisman’s annual meetings. For example, during Talisman’s annual meeting on 3 May 2000, several hundred shareholders protested against the company, carrying placards, distributing leaflets and shouting ‘shame on Talisman’ outside the hotel where the annual meeting was held. At the same time, 15 institutional investors proposed an initiative that would require Talisman to compile and publish within six months a report on its compliance with internationally accepted standards for human rights. The initiative was rejected by the shareholders, with an alternative resolution passed, giving Talisman more time to audit its Sudan project.[xxiv] The 2001 annual meeting experienced similar protests.[xxv]
Some pension funds started to sell their holdings, partly because of mounting concerns over Talisman’s Sudanese operations. For example, in 1999, the Texas Teachers Retirement Fund sold its 100,000-share stake in Talisman; a US investment house, Manning and Napier, sold 1.2 million shares; and TIAA-CREF, a New York-based college teachers’ fund, also reduced its holdings of more than 260,000 shares.[xxvi] As a result, Talisman’s share price fell to three times its cash flow, much lower than a typical price of roughly five times cash flow.[xxvii] Put in other words, the controversy reduced Talisman’s share price by somewhere between a few dollars per share to as much as CAN $15 per share, as estimated by oil analysts in 2000, a time when the stock traded at around CAN $35.
Furthermore, the Canadian government became involved, sending a mission to Sudan in 1999 to investigate human rights violations and Talisman’s operations. John Harker led the mission, with the report released in mid February 2000. The Harker report concluded that there had indeed been a major displacement of civilian populations related to oil extraction; airfields and roads built for Talisman had been used in a few cases by the Sudanese government for military purposes; non-Arabs were seldom hired by GNPOC; and oil was exacerbating conflict in Sudan.
The Harker report also made a few recommendations: Talisman should firmly advocate a cease-fire in South Sudan, Talisman should try to arrange a trust fund to set oil revenues aside for use after peace is restored and Talisman should make sure its Sudanese operations comply with human rights and humanitarian law. While acknowledging that many Canadians expected Talisman to pull out of Sudan or halt production, the report nonetheless predicted that Talisman would be able to pursue an engagement strategy rather than leave Sudan.
Although Talisman had concerns about interfering with issues pertaining to the actions of a sovereign state, and cited its limited influence on the Sudanese government, the Harker report concluded that “if the company is either unwilling or unable to constructively influence the government of Sudan (GOS), perhaps it should not be in the Sudan at this time”.[xxviii]
Talisman’s defence
Talisman tried very hard to justify its Sudan operations. For example, in 1999, Talisman flew 20 analysts and reporters from Canada and the US to Sudan to investigate the situation there. Some of them wrote “glowing investment reports on Talisman”.[xxix] In the same year, Talisman hired several senior lobbyists from Hill & Knowlton to lobby the departments of natural resources, foreign affairs and industry to influence Canada’s policy on Sudan issues.
First, Talisman argued that many of the claims about human rights issues and forced removal were false. In 1998, Buckee called media reports of the dangers in Sudan “lurid and exaggerated”.[xxx] In 1999, Buckee stated that “the Sudanese government was losing a propaganda war because it was doing a ‘very poor job of presenting a better face’”.[xxxi]
Second, Talisman argued that it benefited the people of Sudan through its CSR. In its Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000 Sudan Operations, Talisman described its approach to promoting ethical business activities in Sudan in the areas of human rights, community practice, employee rights, business conduct, and health, safety and environment.[xxxii] For example, Talisman engaged in an extensive dialogue with the Sudanese government to promote a peace process; it completed 15 independent community development projects; and it implemented an Ethical Business Conduct Management System while GNPOC adopted a Code of Ethics.
Third, Talisman argued that peacemaking was beyond its expertise.
Fourth, Talisman asserted that the GNPOC project would have been developed with or without Talisman. Talisman argued that its involvement had made things better, and its withdrawal would make things worse. According to Buckee in November 1999, “The Chinese and Malaysians both wanted 100 per cent of the project and they’re going to do it with or without us, so our view is having a Western presence, and the fact that we keep reporting back to our shareholders, actually ventilates the situation.”[xxxiii]
Finally, Talisman argued that the firm had limited influence on either GNPOC or the Sudanese government. Talisman held only 25 per cent of GNPOC, and pushing human rights in GNPOC could be overruled by Petronas and CNPC, as decisions within GNPOC required “an affirmative vote of at least two consortium members holding at least 60 per cent interest”.[xxxiv] However, Human Rights Watch argued that Talisman actually controlled the ground operations of GNPOC and that it was the lead partner.[xxxv]
Mounting frustration and the final withdrawal
Despite Talisman’s actions, it was relentlessly criticized for its Sudanese operations. The continuous vehement debate with NGOs occupied management’s attention and hurt employees’ morale. Buckee, after spending most of the 2000 annual meeting answering questions about the firm’s Sudan operations, said that “We’re not getting recognition for the things we do … People who say we should get out will certainly not help the people of Sudan. We think, directionally, our presence helps. If we withdraw … it will be taken up by somebody else who, I promise you, cares less than we do.”[xxxvi]
More pressure came from the US. In 1997, President Bill Clinton signed an executive order barring American companies from operating in Sudan, but non-US companies did not fall under this restriction. However, in June 2001, the US House of Representatives passed the Sudan Peace Act barring companies operating in Sudan from raising capital in the US. If the Act became law, Talisman faced the real possibility of being de-listed from the New York Stock Exchange. Although the bill without the capital sanctions was signed by the President in late 2002, the initial bill and the following policy debate put even more pressure on both Talisman and its shareholders. Buckee admitted that access to US capital was ultimately much more important than the firm’s operations in Sudan. Talisman would certainly abide by US laws, even if it had to sell its interest in the Sudan project.[xxxvii]
For Talisman, the threat from the Sudan Peace Act seemed to force it to rethink the political risk involved in its international operations. In June 2001, when Talisman acquired Sweden-based Lundin Petroleum, it excluded from the purchase Lundin assets in Sudan, Libya, Russia and Somalia. In October 2002, Talisman announced it would sell its interests in GNPOC for CAN $1.2 billion to ONGC Videsh, a subsidiary of India’s national oil company Oil and Natural Gas Corp. The Sudanese government reported that it actually preferred to have ONGC as a partner as “it is state owned and the pressures of non-government organisations on it are less than they are on privately owned companies”.[xxxviii]
In 2003, Talisman still suffered from its tainted image. As of mid June 2003, Talisman’s shares traded at slightly more than three times its forecast 2003 cash flow, far below the ratio of 4.4 for rival EnCana. Moreover, protesters still met to protest against Talisman during its annual meeting in May 2003, even though Talisman had already sold its Sudanese operations.[xxxix] Buckee later remarked that, “we were in Sudan for a brief period. Now we’re out. We make a convenient whipping boy.”[xl] Finally, the American Anti-Slavery Group, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan, and other plaintiffs launched a lawsuit against Talisman in November 2001. The lawsuit claimed that Talisman was not only aware but also supportive of the Sudanese government clearing out civilians in areas with potential for oil exploration.[xli] This lawsuit was dismissed in September 2006, as the court found no evidence provided by the plaintiffs for their claims of Talisman’s involvement in rights abuses in Sudan.[xlii] The case was later filed under the US Court of Appeals due to the government passing of the US Alien Tort Claims Act, which allows cases involving international law to be brought to a US court, regardless of where the case originated. The case was finally dismissed in 2010, after two further attempts by the Presbyterian Church of Sudan to appeal the ruling.
Paradoxically, the Sudan issue may have supported Talisman’s international operations. For example, some analysts felt that the Sudan affair “actually earned Talisman goodwill in the Middle East, because of Buckee’s unapologetic manner and hard-line against the opposition”.[xliii] In 2012, Talisman had operations or interests in Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Sierra Leone and Vietnam.
Since 2004, Southern Sudan has been more or less at peace, but Western Sudan has become the new killing field. The international pressure on Sudan’s government to put an end to violence in Darfur has been ongoing.[xliv] Under pressure from the US and other countries, the Sudanese government signed a power-sharing accord with Southern Sudan in May 2004. According to the resulting formal peace settlement in 2005, oil revenues would be divided between the Sudanese government and Southern Sudan. However, the peace agreement accomplished very little, and the division of Sudan’s oil revenues remained a major hurdle because of disputes over whether some functioning oil wells lay in the north or the south.[xlv]
South Sudan
After years of civil unrest, South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011, following a referendum on the matter. The division of the country placed roughly 75 per cent of the oil reserves in South Sudan yet left the majority of the infrastructure, including vital pipelines, in Sudan.[xlvi] This has created an unusual situation whereby oil collected in South Sudan needs to be transported via pipelines through Sudan to reach markets in the Middle East. Tension between the two countries mounted when reports surfaced that Sudan had illegally siphoned crude oil from the pipelines. Sudan claimed that the actions were taken to collect on pipeline transfer payments that were unfulfilled by South Sudan. In January of 2012, South Sudan responded by shutting off oil exports to Sudan. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir subsequently refused to transport any oil through Sudan until disputes over border security were settled.[xlvii]
The impact of blocking exports has had a dramatic effect on South Sudan, which receives 98 per cent of its revenue from oil.[xlviii] The UN World Food Programme report estimated that nearly 4.7 million South Sudanese, more than half of the population, would face food shortages in 2012.[xlix] The issue had become so severe that the United Nations threatened to impose sanctions against the two countries if they did not work towards finding a solution to their conflict.[l] In May 2012, negotiations had yet to develop a solution and the health of both South Sudan and its citizens were in jeopardy.
Lessons learned
After its alarming experience in Sudan, Talisman has re-evaluated its processes for selecting foreign investment locations. Working with the Canadian and American governments has become an important step for Talisman when considering new opportunities. Working with various branches of government helps in getting a better picture of the possible alignment between the Canadian company and a potential investment location. Talisman also works with local NGOs to get opinions on what social issues are affecting each country. This helps Talisman gain a more local perspective and gauge the complexity of the issues it may face. In-depth analysis is performed of potential technical, economic, commercial, legal, political, regulatory, environmental, security and human rights challenges.[li]
For example, before entering Iraq in 2009, Talisman completed an extensive assessment to ensure itself that its operations would be supported by local stakeholders. Consulting with the US Government was also a crucial step, as it is a key stakeholder in both Talisman’s operations and in Iraqi affairs.[lii] The decision to invest in Kurdistan, Iraq did raise some public concern, but Talisman spokesman David Mann stated that “It’s [Kurdistan] not a war zone like the rest of the country. We recognize there are issues, but we’ve done our due diligence. We think it’s manageable.”[liii] Talisman has worked hard to change the perception of its corporate responsibility practices, and the effort is starting to pay off. Maclean’s magazine rated Talisman’s CSR in 2007 as ‘B+’, stating that: “In the years since its exposure to significant human rights issues while in Sudan, Talisman has emerged as a leading company in terms of human rights policies and management.”[liv] As of 2010, the firm was selected as a ‘Top 50 socially responsible company’ by the same magazine. Talisman is now a part of several initiatives including the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which follows standards to report and present information regarding payments from its operations. The company also participates in the United Nations Global
Compact, which focuses on human rights, and labour and environmental practices.
In 2008, indigenous tribes began voicing concerns over potential exploration areas in Talisman’s operations in Peru. Learning from its past experience, Talisman reacted by ensuring that no production would begin unless the firm reached an agreement with local tribes. CEO Mazoni affirmed “I think the lessons (of Sudan) have been learned deeply inside the company.”[lv]
QUESTIONS
- What were Talisman’s motivations to invest in Sudan? Was it a sound decision to do so at the very beginning, from an economic perspective? From a social perspective?
- What were Talisman’s FSAs and Sudan’s LAs? Did the FSAs and LAs complement each other?
- Did Talisman foresee pressures? What were the major elements cited by NGOs against Talisman? How did Talisman try to defend itself and was its reasoning convincing?
- What led to the final withdrawal of Talisman? Did the withdrawal help improve the social welfare in Sudan?
- Would a proactive community engagement strategy on the part of Talisman have reduced the pressure to do something about human rights abuses?
- What options were open to Talisman to shape the behaviour of the combatants?
- Were CNPC and Petronas subject to the same stakeholder pressures that Talisman was subjected to?
- Has Talisman changed because of its experience in Sudan?
NOTES
[i] ‘Fuelling a fire’, The Economist 356 (2 September 2000), 62–3.
[ii] ‘Half of South Sudan facing food shortages, warns UN’, BBC (16 May 2012).
[iii] Randolph Martin, ‘Sudan’s perfect war’, Foreign Affairs (March/April 2002), www.foreign affairs.org/20020301faessay7976/randolph-martin/sudan-s-perfect-war.html, accessed on 11 April 2007.
[iv] www.unitedhumanrights.org/, accessed on 7 October 2007.
[v] www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/g_genocide_intro.html, accessed on 7 October 2007.
[vi] Jemera Rone, ‘Rebels, religion and oil – Sudan’, World Today (1 December 2003), Volume 59, Issue 12.
[vii] Edward Alden, ‘Bush poised to head off oil sanctions in Sudan bill’, Financial Times (8 August 2001), 7.
[viii] ‘Sudan pipeline operational’, Petroleum Economist 66 (August 1999), 15–16.
[ix] Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001).
[x] Ibid.
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] W. J. Simpson, ‘The human factor’, Petroleum Economist 66 (December 1999), 48.
[xiii] Talisman company information, www.talisman-energy.com/, accessed on 11 April 2007.
[xiv] W. J. Simpson, ‘Accelerating move abroad’, Petroleum Economist 65 (October 1998), 33.
[xv] David Buchan, ‘Oil company defends Sudan operation’, Financial Times (17 October 2001), 14.
[xvi] ‘Sudan: Talisman ups Muglad basin reserves estimate’, Petroleum Economist 66 (February 1999).
[xvii] While CNPC is a business corporation, it is also closely linked to the Chinese government. The motivations of CNPC, Petronas and later ONGC for entering Sudan were driven by strategic factors linked to security of energy for their respective governments. Indeed, Sudan has come to dominate China’s foreign oil reserves, accounting for more than one-half of them (Carola Hoyos, ‘China and India fill void left by rights campaigners’, Financial Times (1 March 2006), 3).
[xviii] Simpson, ‘The human factor’, 48.
[xix] Graham Bowley, ‘Talisman may not find good fortune from Sudan oil’, Financial Times (19 November 1999), 14.
[xx] James W. Buckee, Talisman CEO, ‘President’s letter to shareholders’, 10 March 1999, www. Talismanenergy.com/ar98pres.html, accessed on 3 February 2001.
[xxi] New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), Statement of the Sudanese Churches on the oil factor in the conflict in the Sudan, press release (12 April 2000). The statement was signed by the chairmen and other officers of the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) based in Khartoum and the NSCC based in Nairobi, 14 April 2000, the temporary branch of the SCC. Cited by Human Rights Watch, ‘Sudan, oil, and human rights’ (2003), www.hrw.org/ reports/2003/sudan1103/23.htm#_ftn1183, accessed on 11 April 2007.
[xxii] Search on ABI, based on human rights, Sudan, and Talisman in document texts in the year 1998, accessed on 7 April 2007.
[xxiii] Search on ABI, based on human rights, Sudan, and Talisman in document texts in the year 1999, accessed on 7 April 2007.
[xxiv] Ian McKinnon and Carol Howes, ‘Talisman unfazed by Sudan protests. Annual meeting; shareholders reject proposed timeline for operations report’, National Post (4 May 2000), C.7.
[xxv] James Stevenson, ‘Sudan overhangs Talisman annual meeting despite record profit, new dividend [First quarter results]’, Canadian Press NewsWire (1 May 2001), n/a.
[xxvi] Charles Frank, ‘U.S. teacher fund sells Talisman shares’, Calgary Herald (10 December 1999), C.1.FRO.
[xxvii] Paul Waldie and Charlie Gillis, ‘Talisman to embark on share buyback: Buckee admits Sudanese operations have hurt stock price’, National Post (15 December 1999), C.1.FRO.
[xxviii] John Harker, ‘Human security in Sudan: the report of a Canadian assessment mission’ (January 2000), prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 17–18.
[xxix] Timothy Pritchard, ‘Talisman Energy criticized over its holdings in Sudan’, New York Times (26 November 1999), 10.
[xxx] Simpson, ‘Accelerating move abroad’, 33.
[xxxi] Simpson, ‘The human factor’, 48.
[xxxii] Talisman Energy, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000: Sudan operations’ (2001).
[xxxiii] Elizabeth Wine, ‘Paying a heavy price for a partnership’, Financial Times (31 March 2000), 04.
[xxxiv] Talisman Energy, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2001’ (2001), 13.
[xxxv] Human Rights Watch, ‘Sudan, oil, and human rights’ (2003), www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ sudan1103/23.htm#_ftn1183, accessed on 11 April 2007.
[xxxvi] Ian McKinnon and Carol Howes, ‘Talisman unfazed by Sudan protests. Annual meeting; shareholders reject proposed timeline for operations report’, National Post (4 May 2000), C.7.
[xxxvii] Claudia Cattaneo, ‘Talisman raises (ps)250M: Denies it went to Europe to avoid Sudan controversy’, National Post (6 April 2002), FP.3.
[xxxviii] ‘Redrawing the map’, Petroleum Economist (May 2005), 1.
[xxxix] George Koch, ‘Stuck in the sand’, National Post (1 July 2003), 46.
[xl] ‘Canadian values at the international table’, Petroleum Economist (January 2005), 1.
[xli] David Glovin, ‘Talisma court upholds Sudan genocide suit dismissal’, Bloomberg (2 October 2009).
[xlii] Shaun Polczer, ‘Talisman cleared of Sudan charges: judge rejects suit alleging rights abuses’, Calgary Herald (13 September 2006), A.1.Fro.
[xliii] Petroleum Economist, ‘Canadian values’, 1.
[xliv] ‘Turning the screw Darfur’, Economist.com/Global Agenda (4 January 2007), 1.
[xlv] BBC News Online, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4594242.stm, accessed on 10 April 2007.
[xlvi] Jared Ferrie, ‘South Sudan says it will no longer export oil through Sudan’, Bloomberg Businessweek (23 April, 2012).
[xlvii] ‘Sudan’s Bashir says no to S.Sudan oil exports without security’, Reuters (16 May 2012).
[xlviii] Jared Ferrie, ‘South Sudan says it will no longer export oil through Sudan’, Bloomberg Businessweek (23 April, 2012).
[xlix] ‘Half of South Sudan facing food shortages, warns UN’, BBC (16 May 2012).
[l] Jared Ferrie, ‘South Sudan says its ready to negotiate deal on oil at talks’, Bloomberg Businessweek (10 May 2012).
[li] Talisman company information, ‘Human rights’, 2012.
[lii] Darren Campbell, ‘Lessons from Talisman Energy Inc’s Sudanese foray’, Alberta Oil (1 June 2011).
[liii] ‘Talisman heads into Iraq with $300 million stake’, Calgary Herald (24 June 2008).
[liv] ‘The company rankings’, Maclean’s 120 (48) (10 December 2007), 68.
[lv] ‘Talisman’s learned lessons from Sudan’, Calgary Herald (1 May 2008).